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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of community on household income in rural China. 
The analytical focus is, first, on the significance of physical infrastructure, human capital, 
and social capital at the community level, and second on the role of public management 
and public policy at the local level. The estimation results of household income using a 
hierarchical linear model demonstrate that community-level variables have significant 
effects on household income, and their impact varies according to the type of the 
community. Regarding public policy, the findings of this paper suggest the importance 
of institution building to cultivate governing ability for rural cadres, to promote social 
stability, and to develop mechanisms to meet local needs for public services. 
JEL classification: D31; P25; Z13 
Keywords: household income; community; social capital; rural China.
1 I. Introduction 
A. Setting the Agenda 
  This paper places special emphasis on the impact of community on household 
income in rural China. The analytical focus is, first, on the significance of physical 
infrastructure, human capital, and social capital at the community level, and second on 
the role of public management and public policy at the local level. The estimation results 
of household income using a hierarchical linear model demonstrate that community-level 
variables have significant effects on household income, and their impact varies 
according to the type of the community. Regarding public policy, the findings of this 
paper suggest the importance of institution building to cultivate governing ability for 
rural cadres, to promote social stability, and to develop mechanisms to meet local needs 
for public services. 
  In the context of this paper, the term “community level” refers to the 
administrative villages (xingzhengcun) that are at the lowest level of the 
party/governmental hierarchy (hereafter referred to as “village”). In relation to the main 
theme of the entire volume, this paper focuses on the factors at the village level for two 
reasons, as follows. 
  First, by looking more closely at the influence of village characteristics we would 
be able to provide a fuller picture of the determinants of income inequality in rural China. 
As previous research such as that of Narayan and Pritchett (1999) has noted, household 
income depend on community-level factors in the rural areas of developing countries. 
Thus, it will be interesting to examine the type of community factors that affect 
household income in the Chinese context. Instead of using a simple location dummy 
variable as most of the previous studies have adopted, we examine community 
characteristics in some detail because our survey contains information regarding the 
1 villages where the sample households are located.
  Second, bearing in mind the multilayered and highly decentralized local 
administrative/fiscal system in China, we believe that the role of government and public 
policy regarding income inequality should be examined not only at the macro-level but 
also at the meso level, that is, at the county and subcounty levels (township and village). 
In fact, townships and villages have assumed an important responsibility for providing 
local public goods. As a result, large disparities in the provision of local public goods are 
observed, even among villages in the same county.
2 We assume that such regional 
disparity is one of the causes of regional income inequality in rural China. 
  It may be claimed that the deepening of marketization in rural China throughout 
the 1990s, for example the development of rural–urban migration and the privatization 
of collectively owned rural enterprises, has weakened the influence of village-level 
factors on households’ economic activities. It may also be argued that recent political 
and economic reforms in rural areas, including tax reform and the restructuring of the 
local administrative system, tend to weaken the direct influence over households of the 
political economy at the village level. However, we believe that an investigation 
focusing on the village level remains important for the following reasons. First, the 
progress of marketization and political and economic reforms has involved great 
regional disparities. Second, the progress of marketization has not necessarily reduced 
the importance of formal institutional arrangements in influencing household income, 
although it has redefined the role of village management. For example, instead of 
allocating economic resources directly, the village might have become important as a 
provider of local public goods, which both directly and indirectly influences household 
income. Third, by shedding light on the village, we will be able to examine the role of 
informal institutional factors on household income.   
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    This paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of this section, we discuss 
the previous research and the main data sources. Section II presents the analytical 
framework and the strategy for empirical study. In Section III, we estimate household 
income functions employing village-specific factors. We then elaborate how the 
characteristics of village management and public policy affect household income. 
Section IV concludes the paper. 
B. Previous Research 
 Researchers  who  have conducted field surveys in rural China have been surprised 
by the substantial economic disparities among villages within the same county or even in 
the same township. Consequently, the literature has focused on the importance of meso 
level disparities. For example, based on a village survey in Handan (Hebei), Knight and 
Li (1997) discussed the “cumulative causation” of microregional economic development, 
which resulted in economic disparities among villages in the same district. Using data 
collected in suburban Tianjin, Perkins (2003) demonstrated that large economic 
variations existed among villages in a township, including wide differences in size, 
economic structure, and levels of well being. Sato (2003) provided a typology of market 
development at the meso level, based on a series of village and household surveys in five 
provinces.
3
  Studies based on the meso level surveys can identify unique regional factors that 
influence income inequality. For example, Perkins (2003) revealed that intervillage 
economic disparities were linked closely to historical variations in the survey area. 
However, it is difficult to generalize about findings derived from village-based surveys. 
In contrast, quantitative studies using large micro datasets allow generalization of results. 
Such studies generally investigate region-specific factors by employing simple regional 
or geographical dummy variables; as a result, they prohibit the understanding of the 
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  socioeconomic implications behind such dummy variables. This paper attempts to fill 
out the simple regional dummies by introducing other region-specific characteristics. 
C. Data 
  The main data source for this analysis is the rural household and administrative 
village surveys conducted by the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) Team at the 
Institute of Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) (hereafter 
referred to as the 2002 CASS CHIP survey).
4 Through the administrative village survey 
conducted simultaneously with the household survey, we collected officially recorded 
statistical data and other village-level information on the 961 villages where the 9200 
sample households are located by circulating a questionnaire to village cadres (see 
Appendix Table A regarding the distribution of sample villages in the surveyed 
provinces).
5 The sample villages of the NBS household survey were selected in each 
province by the provincial bureau of the NBS.
 The sample households were then drawn 
from each sample village (usually 10 households for each village).
6
  For the basic village statistics, we asked the statisticians to provide the officially 
recorded figures for 2002 and 1998. For the remaining quantitative data that are not 
officially recorded and for the historical data, we used the figures provided by the village 
cadres. Qualitative information of villages’ socioeconomic conditions was also provided 
by the village cadres. 
  Because of the small number of sample households in each village, caution is 
required when using different data sets from the village and the household surveys, 
especially with regard to village-level variables aggregated from household data. As 
income-related data from the village survey are consistent with the data aggregated from 
the household survey, it is safe to argue that the income of sample households can 
represent that of sample villages.
7 This does not, however, hold for other variables. 
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  Therefore, for village characteristics, we avoid using aggregated variables with the 
exception of two variables for which no data are available from the village survey: the 
degree of social stability evaluated by the heads of households and the village’s average 
education level. We believe that the bias is relatively small for the former variable 
because, in the context of rural China, villagers will share similar views about their 
village’s social conditions. Concerning the latter variable, we introduce a village-level 
variable that is not the simple aggregation of the household level. It should be noted that, 
for the requirements of the village-mean centered modeling, several village-level 
variables aggregated from household data will also be employed. 
 
II. Framework for the Empirical Study 
A. Analytical Framework 
  Figure 1 introduces the analytical framework. Household income, that is, the 
dependent variable used throughout this paper, is the log of the per capita annual net 
income in 2002 (measured in yuan, in 2002 prices) (see Table 1). The definition of 
household income employed is consistent with the NBS’s official peasant income 
statistics.
8 We attempt to determine the magnitude and direction of village-specific 
factors on income inequality by estimating the household income function. As shown in 
Figure 1, we divide the village-specific factors into four categories: physical 
infrastructure; human capital endowment; level of social capital; and factors relating to 
public management and public policy at the village level. It is assumed that the effects of 
village-specific factors vary according to the basic socioeconomic conditions of the 
village. To sort out the differences in the effects of the village-specific factors among the 
different types of villages, we use measurements of the level of economic development 
(as measured by the share of village labor employed mainly in the nonagricultural 
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  sector), geographical location, and historical level of labor mobility. 
  As we are interested in the effects of group (village) membership of households 
on their income, we employ a two-level hierarchical linear model instead of OLS. The 
first (micro) level is the household level and the second (macro) level is the village 
level.
9 In this model, households are grouped into villages and village characteristics are 
assumed to exercise a common influence on all households within the village. 
  When there exists one household level of characteristics (x) and one village level 
of characteristics (z) that influence the per capita income (y) (in logarithm throughout 
the paper), the first (household) level model is written as follows: 
 y ij = β0j + β1j xij + εij,   (1a)
where ε is the micro error term, and subscript i is for the household, and j is for the 
village. The second (village) level model that includes village characteristics (z) is 
described as follows. 
  β0j = γ00 + γ01zj + δ0j,    (1b) 
  β1j = γ10 + γ11zj + δ1j,   (1c) 
where the subscript j indicates the village, and the δ is the macro error term. 
 Implicit  in  this  formulation is the assumption that the relationship between 
household income and household characteristics depends on features of the village. So, 
for example, the returns to education may differ between villages with higher and lower 
levels of development. 
  Substitution provides the following two-level hierarchical linear model: 
 y ij = γ00 + γ01zj + δ0j + (γ10 + γ11zj + δ1j) xij + εij  
 =  γ00 + γ10xij + γ01zj + γ11zj xij + (δ0j + δ1j xij + εij). (2) 
Equation (2) illustrates that per capita income y is a function of the following 
components: overall intercept γ00 that demonstrates the grand-mean effect; the main 
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  effect of village characteristics z (γ01); the overall slope γ10 (the average x-y regression 
slope across villages) that represents the main effect of household characteristics x; the 
cross-level interaction of household and village characteristics (γ11); and random effects 
(δ0j + δ1j xij + εij).
10  
  Equation (2) can be written as the combination of the fixed part 
 E (yij) = γ00 + γ10xij + γ01zj + γ11zj xij, (3a)
and the random part 
 y ij – E(yij) = δ0j + δ1j xij + εij. (3b)
  In a hierarchical linear model, the first level variables can be measured either in 
their original levels (raw score form) or as deviations from the village mean 
(group-mean centered form). We conduct estimations using equations in both raw score 
form and village-mean centered form. A village-mean centered first level variable  x ij is 
equal to  x ij = xij – x j, where xij is the raw score for household i in village j and  x j is the 
village-mean of the variable for village j. 
  Both approaches are instructive. If one wants to explain as much variation in the 
dependent variable as possible, the raw score form is useful. If one is interested in 
particular village-level effects and cross-level interactions between the village and the 
household levels, a village-mean centered model with the reintroduction of village-mean 
variables is appropriate (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). In the following empirical study, 
we will first overview the type of household- and village-level characteristics that 
influence household income using the raw score form, and then examine the 
second-level effects and cross-level interactions employing the village-mean centered 
model.  
B. Village-Level Variables 
  As summarized in Table 1, we employ the following village-level variables: 
    7 
   [a]  Physical  infrastructure: Previous research emphasized the importance of 
physical infrastructure for regional economic development and poverty alleviation in 
developing countries (Antle 1983; Lipton and Ravallion 1995). We concentrate on 
electricity, a type of small-scale physical infrastructure that is common to almost all 
villages but introduced at different times historically, as an indicator of the overall level 
of development of small-scale physical infrastructure. Specifically, we introduce a 
dummy variable for the periods when the villages were first equipped with electricity: 1 
= 1949--1979; 0 = after 1980 [a-1]. We assume that this variable positively correlates 
with household income. 
  In addition, as an additional indicator of the level of agricultural infrastructure we 
employ the logit-transformed share of farmland that is irrigated in 2002 [a-2].
11
 [b]  Village-level human capital: The literature have confirmed that, along with 
the marketization, the return to education has increased substantially in rural China. (see, 
for example, Yue et al. forthcoming; Walder 2002; Zhang, Huang, and Rozelle 2002). 
We assume that a higher average educational attainment at the village level has a 
positive effect on household income because it will induce efficient economic interaction 
among villagers, assisting villagers to exchange useful information and skills. 
  As the indicator of village-level human capital, we introduce two variables. One 
is the share of adult population (over 16 years old) who have completed junior high 
school or a higher educational level, which is used in the raw score form model [b-1]. 
The other is the average number of years of education of working-age adults (16–65 
years old), which is used in the village-mean centered form model [b-2]. 
  [c] Village-level social capital: Generally, social capital is conceptualized as the 
level of trust, the degree to which common norms are shared, and the density of 
associational activities among community members (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000). 
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  Narayan and Pritchett (1999), using a village survey in Tanzania, discussed how 
household income depends greatly on the village-level social capital, specifically, the 
extent and characteristics of the villagers’ associational activities. According to their 
study, the proximate channels through which village social capital influences household 
income are: better public services, greater use of modern technology, more community 
activity, and greater use of credit. 
  It would be interesting to examine whether such social factors exhibit positive 
externalities in rural China. Given the general context of rural China and the framework 
of this paper, however, the link between community-level associational activities and 
household income may not be relevant. This is because such activities are not common 
in general and because the administrative village is not necessarily a suitable unit of 
observation for such activities.
12 Instead, we focus on the degree of social stability at the 
village level as village-specific social capital, considering that social stability can be 
regarded as the basis for other social factors. Following previous research such as Knack 
and Keefer (1997), we assume a causal linkage between social stability, higher 
incentives and lower risks for economic activities, and higher income. 
  As the proxy of social stability, we employ two attitudinal questions to the head 
of household. These questions are: “Do you think that there is a good relationship among 
households belonging to different small village groups (cunmin xiaozu)?” and “Do you 
think that there is a good relationship among households belonging to different family 
groups?” To measure social stability, we categorized the answers into points ranging 
from five (strongly agree) to one (strongly disagree), and then summed these numbers to 
create a scale with a maximum of 10. 
  Analysis of social capital inevitably encounters the problem of endogeneity, 
because social stability could be the result rather than the cause of good economic 
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  conditions in the village. The justification for introducing this variable into the 
cross-section analysis is that the sociocultural characteristics of villages tend to be stable 
over time. 
  [d] Characteristics of village management: Activities of the village authority are 
expected to have both a direct and an indirect influence on household income. While the 
role of village in China is rather complicated and multidimensional, we can categorize 
the role of village management as follows: (1) village as an economic agent; (2) village 
as a provider of local public goods; and (3) village as a mediator of conflicts within the 
community. 
  Since the 1980s, one of the unique characteristics of Chinese villages has been 
their role as an economic agent. First, villages have been owners and operators of rural 
enterprises and other collective businesses (see, for example Chen 1998; Oi 1999). 
Acting as an economic agent in this manner, the village can directly provide employment 
opportunities. Many village-level collective economic entities have disappeared under 
fierce market competition and the wave of privatization of rural industries. Nevertheless, 
some villages have kept managing collective economic entities. To capture this factor, 
we compile a dummy variable that indicates whether the village has a collective 
economic entity (enterprises and other business entities) [d-1].
13 It should be noted that 
former village-owned enterprises that were privatized in the 1990s are also included 
because many such enterprises keep informal relationships with the village. Second, 
villages have recently been inclined to mediate economic opportunities for villagers 
rather than directly operate collective businesses. To capture the activity of the village in 
this manner, we employ a dummy variable indicating whether the village cadres have 
attracted any investment projects from outside the village up to 2002 [d-2]. 
 Concerning  the  role of the village as the provider of local public goods, we 
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  introduce the following two variables. First, as an indicator of production-related public 
services, we employ a dummy variable indicating whether the village provides irrigation 
services using collectively owned irrigation facilities [d-3]. Second, as a proxy of the 
level of local public goods, we employ the log of the per capita expenditure in the 
administrative village budget [d-4]. This includes expenditures on production-related 
services, education, public health, and other public services. To avoid the problem of 
endogeneity and to examine how the initial state of the provision of local public goods 
influences subsequent economic outcomes, we use the village budget statistics for 1998. 
  Village cadres formally and informally act as mediators between villagers with 
different interests. In this sense, the above-mentioned degree of social stability at the 
village level can also be regarded as an indicator of the governing ability of the village 
[c-1/d-5]. 
  [e] Other village-level variables: In addition to these village-specific variables, 
we introduce a dummy variable for villages that suffered from a natural disaster in 2002 
to control the impact of external shocks on households [e-1]. Also, village-mean 
variables for farmland [e-2] and productive fixed assets [e-3] are used in the 
village-mean centered estimations. 
  [f] Types of village: As mentioned above, to control for the different effects of 
village-level variables in the different types of villages, we classify the sample villages 
according to the following three criteria.
14
  First, as the proxy of the overall level of economic development, we introduce 
the logit-transformed share of nonagricultural employment in 2002 [f-1]. 
Nonagricultural employment share is defined as the share of the total labor force in the 
village that is mainly employed in the nonagricultural sector.
15 Using this measurement, 
we also group the villages into underdeveloped villages and developed villages. 
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  Underdeveloped villages are villages with a lower nonagricultural employment share 
(less than the median, that is, 30 percent or less). Developed villages have a higher share 
(more than 30 percent). Second, regarding the geographical location, we introduce a 
dummy variable for nonmountainous villages [f-2]. Third, to capture the historical level 
of labor mobility, we employ a dummy variable for the villages where approximately 
more than 10 percent of labor force had worked outside their home township for more 
than one month at the beginning of the 1990s [f-3]. 
C. Household-Level Variables 
  For the household-level model, two sets of explanatory variables are used (Table 
1). First, for cross-referencing, we introduce a set of basic household attributes: 
contracted farmland; productive fixed assets; education level of working-age adults; 
Communist Party membership; average age of working-age adults; household size; and 
dependency ratio (ratio of total household members to working-age adults). Second, we 
introduce a set of village-mean centered variables for contracted farmland; productive 
fixed assets; and education level of working-age adults employed for village-mean 
centered equations. 
  For our empirical study, in addition to the above-mentioned household attributes, 
we need to control the degree to which each household is independent from the 
village-level political economy. For this purpose, we introduce a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the household had any income earned outside the village. 
 
 
III. Empirical Results 
  In this section, we first confirm the magnitude of the intervillage disparity in 
household income, and second, we describe the basic findings of the household income 
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  function using the hierarchal linear model. 
A. The Magnitude of Village-Level Factors 
  To confirm the magnitude of the overall effect of village-specific factors on 
household income, we first estimate the following intercept-only model (the one-way 
ANOVA with random effects) that contains only the dependent variable (yij), and no 
explanatory variables:
16
 y ij = γ00 + δ0j + εij.    (5) 
  The fixed effect γ00 demonstrates the average of village mean income (in 
logarithm). Two random effects δ0j and εij indicate the variance components at the village 
level (intervillage variance) and household level (intravillage variance), respectively. We 
can thus decompose the total variation in household income into variations between and 
within villages. 
  Table 2 reports the estimation results. The intraclass correlation, that is, the 
contribution ratio of intervillage variance to total variance demonstrates that about 42 
percent of the total variance of per capita income is explained by the intervillage 
variance. As is shown in the latter half of the table, the contribution ratio of intervillage 
variance is larger for mountainous villages and developed villages, suggesting that the 
magnitude of intervillage disparity does not simply decrease along with the level of 
regional economic development. 
B. Overview of the Estimation Results 
  Table 3 summarizes the results of the two-level hierarchical linear models for 
household income, employing the village- and household-level explanatory variables 
listed in Table 1. The first column of the table is the baseline estimation using the 
village-mean centered form, which includes village-mean centered household-level 
variables on the endowments of physical/human capital and other household-level 
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  variables, village-mean variables for physical/human capital, and indicators of the basic 
socioeconomic conditions of the village. This specification is used as the baseline to 
confirm the effects of household-level factors and to elaborate the effects of 
village-specific factors in the different types of villages. The second column is the full 
specification using the village-mean centered form, which adds all the village-specific 
variables to the baseline specification. The third column is the full specification using 
the raw score form.
17  
  Before examining the effects of village-specific factors, it will be convenient to 
confirm whether the findings on household-level variables are consistent with other 
studies using the same data set. As mentioned above, we refer to the income function 
using OLS in Yue, Sicular, Li, and Gustafsson (forthcoming). Table 3 demonstrates that 
the results of the baseline estimation and the full specification using the raw score form 
equation are basically consistent with Yue, Sicular, Li, and Gustafsson (forthcoming).
18
  We now turn to the full specification to determine the effects of village-specific 
factors. The results from the village-mean centered form and from the raw score form 
are basically the same and suggest the following facts. 
  First, village-level physical infrastructure and human capital endowment result in 
positive externalities on household income. Households living in villages equipped with 
electricity before the reform era enjoyed approximately 9 percent higher income in 2002. 
Variables for the education level of the village are positive and statistically significant 
both in the raw score and in the village-mean centered equation. In the village-mean 
centered equation, it is revealed that adding one year of education to a village’s average 
educational standard raises the villagers’ income by approximately 6 percent. 
  Second, the degree of social stability, proxy of village social capital, has positive 
and statistically significant effects on household income. If the measure of stable social 
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  relationships rises by one point, the villagers’ income rises by around 3 percent. As 
mentioned above, the result can also be understood as implying the significance of the 
village cadre’s ability to promote good social relationships within the village. 
  Third, estimation results for the variables relating to village management, on the 
whole, suggest that public management and public policy at the village level play a 
significant role in income inequality. All other factors are equal, having a village-level 
collective economic entity raises villagers’ income by 6–8 percent. Both of the full 
specification equations demonstrate that larger village expenditure on public services in 
the past has brought an increase in the villagers’ current income. It is also demonstrated 
that controlling the share of irrigated land in the total arable and permanent cropland and 
providing collective irrigation management through the village’s use of collectively 
owned facilities have a positive and significant effect on household income. Contrary to 
these factors, the presence in a village of investment projects attracted by village cadres 
reveals no statistically significant effect, though it is, as expected, positive. 
 Fourth,  basic  socioeconomic  conditions of the village also significantly correlate 
with household income. It is shown that a higher nonagricultural employment share at 
the village level is accompanied by higher income. Full specification equations reveal 
that, given all other factors are equal, being part of nonmountainous villages raises 
household income by approximately 14–16 percent. The negative and significant 
coefficient on the historical level of labor mobility suggests that the propensity for 
out-migration is higher in lower income villages. 
C. Role of Village Management and Public Policy 
  Our next step is to investigate further the role of public management and public 
policy at the village level. Here we focus on three variables that represent different 
aspects of village management: (1) a dummy for a collective economic entity 
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  representing the village’s role as an economic agent; (2) the size of the village budget for 
public services, which indicates the role of the village as a provider of local public 
goods; and (3) the degree of social stability, which is regarded as a proxy of village 
cadre’s governing ability. These three variables have positive, significant coefficients in 
our regressions (Table 3). We would like to explore further whether the impact of public 
management differs among different types of villages. We therefore compare the 
estimation results obtained by running regressions separately for different village types. 
In addition, we examine the cross-level interactions between village-level variables and 
household returns to education. 
  Table 4 reports the estimate results by type of village. Several points are 
noteworthy. First, the significance of village management is, on the whole, greater in the 
villages with a lower historical level of labor mobility. Two of the three relevant 
variables become insignificant in the case of villages that had high propensity for 
out-migration at the beginning of the 1990s. 
  Second, the coefficient on collective economic entities becomes insignificant in 
underdeveloped villages and mountainous villages, while it is positive and significant in 
developed villages and nonmountainous villages. One explanation for this finding is that, 
after the deepening of marketization in the 1990s, only competitive village-level 
collective economic entities in developed nonmountainous regions were economically 
viable and provided villagers with lucrative opportunities. In other words, most 
collective economic entities in underdeveloped and mountainous villages had difficulty 
providing villagers with earning opportunities. Note that former village-owned 
enterprises that were privatized are included and treated as collective economic entities. 
Consequently, these results indicate that collective rural industrialization in the early 
reform era still plays a role in income determination, even after the wave of privatization 
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  in the 1990s. 
  Third, the effect of public expenditure is also insignificant in underdeveloped and 
mountainous villages. This finding implies that public goods provision at the meso level 
tends to be inefficient in underdeveloped and mountainous villages. This could arise due 
to the lack of economies of scale in public goods provision caused by the limited 
financial ability and geographical conditions, or due to the low governing ability at the 
village level and to the lack of provision of complementary public goods by upper levels 
of government. This finding suggests that it is necessary to improve intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers to underdeveloped, mountainous regions and, at the same time, to provide 
an effective mechanism to meet local needs for the delivery of public goods. 
  Fourth, contrary to the above-mentioned aspects of village management, the 
coefficient on social stability is larger in underdeveloped and mountainous villages. This 
suggests that the role of informal institutional factors is more important when the overall 
level of economic development and marketization is low and the formal institutional 
infrastructure is underdeveloped. The policy implication of this result is that not only the 
physical infrastructure but also the development of the institutional infrastructure that 
promotes social stability may be essential for income growth and poverty alleviation in 
the underdeveloped regions. 
  Lastly, we cannot draw a simple picture of the relationship between the role of 
village management and the level of economic development or marketization. We cannot 
simply assume that the overall impact of village management on household income 
declines along with the marketization. The impact of village management on household 
income appears to be related more to the historical level of labor mobility. Further 
research is required to elaborate the changing role of public management and public 
policy at the meso level, taking into consideration various other village-level factors and 
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  cross-level interactions of village, township, county, and upper administrations. 
  Let us now turn our attention to the cross-level interaction effects between village 
management and household income. Here we focus on the influence of the 
characteristics of village management on the average rate of return to education at the 
household level. The estimation results are revealed in Table 5, which shows a positive 
and significant interaction effect. It is suggested that larger village expenditure for public 
services in the past has brought about a larger rate of return to education (Table 5a). By 
conducting estimates by the types of village, we have determined a larger and more 
significant interaction effect in nonmountainous villages (Table 5b). This finding 
supports the relevance of the aforementioned larger impact of public expenditure on 
household income in developed nonmountainous regions. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
  The major findings of this paper and their implications are summarized as 
follows. First, we have confirmed that village-specific factors significantly influence 
household income determination. This finding is consistent with previous research and 
suggests that not only the macro-level institutional and policy environment and 
micro-level factors, but also meso level factors should be considered when we 
investigate income inequality in rural China. Second, not only the endowments of 
physical and human capital at the village level but also the community’s social capital 
have a significant effect on household income. It should be noted that its impact is 
stronger in underdeveloped, mountainous regions. Third, estimation results for the 
variables relating to village management, on the whole, suggest that many aspects of the 
role of the village - - as economic agent, provider of local public goods, and promoter of 
social stability - - have a significant effect on household income. It is noteworthy that 
    18 
  public goods provision at the meso level tends to be inefficient in underdeveloped 
mountainous regions. This finding reveals a serious problem in rural China, that is, the 
large regional disparity in the effectiveness of public policy caused by the difference 
between delivery and finance of local public goods, by the lack of an effective 
mechanism of intergovernmental fiscal transfer, and by the limited governing ability at 
the local level. 
  The findings here hold certain implications for incomes and public policy in rural 
China derived from this paper. First, not only the construction of physical infrastructure 
but also the development of an institutional infrastructure that promotes social stability is 
relevant for income growth in underdeveloped regions. Second, the delivery of public 
services remains ineffective in underdeveloped regions, which suggests that it is 
necessary to improve intergovernmental fiscal transfers to underdeveloped regions and, 
at the same time, provide an effective mechanism to capture local needs. 
  We conclude by stating a concern over possible unfavorable policy outcomes of 
certain recent rural reforms, including the taxation reform. Although the decrease of the 
peasants’ tax burden has an equalizing impact in the short run, if it is not accompanied 
by a substantial increase in intergovernmental fiscal transfer and by improved efficiency 
of delivery of public services, the result may be a reduction of basic public services, and 
unequal effects in the long run. The village survey provides evidence for such 
unfavorable consequences. For example, of the 634 villages where the taxation reform 
was launched in 2002, 304 villages reported that the total amount of funds available for 
villages’ education needs, which are obtained from a village’s own funds and upper 
administration, decreased following the reform. Moreover, there was a statistically 
significant association between income levels and changes in funding for education. 
Poor villages were more likely to report that they had suffered a reduction in funding for 
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  education.
19 Further research is needed on the relationship between income inequality 
and meso level public policy.
20
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Research Center for Rural Economy, The Ministry of Agriculture. Table 1 Description and Summary Statistics of Variables Used in This Paper 




Dependent variable       
Per capita income for 2002  The log of per capita annual net income based 




Village-level variables       
[a-1: Physical infrastructure] Equipped with 
electricity before the reform era 
Dummy variable for the periods when the 
village was equipped with electricity   
 
0.640 (0.480)  V 
[a-2: Physical infrastructure]   
Share of irrigated farmland 
The logit-transformed share of irrigated 





[b-1: Human capital] 
Share of junior high graduates 
The share of adult population that has 
completed junior high school or a higher 
educational level, 2002   
 
0.621 (0.173)  H 
[b-2: Human capital] 
Village-mean years of education 
Average number of years of education of 
working-age adults (16-65 years old) 
 
7.110 (1.190)  H 
[c-1 / d-5: Social capital/village management]   
Social stability 
Average of household head's evaluation of 
the degree of social stability in the village 
(scale from 1 to 10) 
 
7.552 (1.008)  H 
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  [d-1: Village management] 
Collective economic entities 
Dummy for villages managing collective 
economic entities in 2002 
 
0.262 (0.440)  V 
[d-2: Village management]   
Inward investment 
Dummy for villages having inward 
investment projects attracted by village 
cadres until 2002 
 
0.114 (0.318)  V 
[d-3: Village management]   
Irrigation services by the village 
Dummy for villages providing irrigation 
services using collectively owned facilities in 
2002 
0.263 (0.440)  V 
[d-4: Village management]   
Village budget for public services, 1998 
The log of per capita expenditure for public 
services in 1998 (yuan, 2002 prices)   
 
2.066 (1.612)   
[29.48 (86.67)] 
V 
[e-1: External shock] 
Natural disaster 
Dummy for villages suffering natural disaster 
in 2002 
0.514 (0.500)  V 
[e-2] Village-mean farmland 
 
Average area of per capita contracted 
farmland, 2002 (mu) 
1.425 (1.512)  H 
[e-3] Village-mean fixed assets 
 
Average value of per capita productive fixed 
assets, 2002 (yuan) 
1245.63 (1699.44) H 
Types of village (Basic socioeconomic conditions)       
[f-1: Level of economic development]   
Nonagricultural employment share 
The logit-transformed share of labor force in 
the village that is mainly employed in the 
nonagricultural sector, 2002 (developed 
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  underdeveloped villages=30%or less share)   
[f-2: Geographical location]   
Nonmountainous villages 
 
Dummy for villages located in
nonmountainous area 
  0.781 (0.414)  V 
[f-3: Historical level of labor mobility] 
Development of out-migration   
Dummy for the degree of development of 
out-migration at the beginning of the 1990s 
0.400 (0.490)  V 
Household-level variables       
Farmland (in raw score form)  Per capita contracted farmland, 2002 (mu)  1.425 (1.856)   
 
H 
Village-mean centered farmland  The  deviation of the household's farmland 
from the village-mean 
    H
Fixed  assets  The log of the per capita value of fixed 
productive assets at the time of purchase , 




Village-mean centered fixed assets  The deviation of household's value of fixed 
assets from the village-mean 
    H
Education level (in raw score form)  Average years of education of working-age 
adults, 2002 
7.065 (2.023)  H 
Village-mean centered education level 
 
The deviation of household's education level 
from the village-mean 
    H
Party membership  Dummy  for  households with communist 
party members, 2002 
0.211 (0.408)  H 
Average age of working-age adults 
 
Average age of working-age adults, 2002      37.670  (7.47) H
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Household size   
 
Total number of household members, 2002  4.141 (1.280)  H 
Dependency ratio  Total number of household 
members divided by the number of 
household members of working-age, 2002   
1.416 (0.466)  H 
Having income earned outside the village  Dummy for households with income earned 
outside the village in 2002 
0.312 (0.463)  H 
Number of observations    9104   
Notes: 
1. H indicates that the data are taken from the household data set and V indicates they are from the administrative village data 
set. 
2. Figures in brackets show mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the original value of the relevant variable. Table 2 Magnitude of the Intervillage Disparity in Rural Household Income, 2002 
Dependent variable: Log of per capita income in 2002  Variance 
components 
1.  The  whole  villages                       [N=9104,  956  villages]   
   Intervillage  variance    0.208 
   Intravillage  variance    0.289 
   Intraclass  correlation  
      (contribution ratio of intervillage variance to total variance) 
 0.42 
2. Intraclass correlation by the basic socioeconomic conditions of villages   
  A.  Level  of  economic  development measured by the nonagricultural 
    employment  share 
 
     Underdeveloped  villages               [N=4469, 486 villages]  0.30 
     Developed  villages                    [N=4635, 470 villages]  0.49 
  B.  Geographical  locations   
     Mountainous  villages                  [N=1995, 201 villages]   0.44 
     Nonmountainous  villages              [N=7109, 755 villages]   0.38 
Notes:  
1. This table reports the results of restricted maximum likelihood estimates of the variance 
components at the village level (intervillage variance) and the household level (intravillage 
variance). 
2. Intraclass correlation is calculated as intervillage variance / (intervillage variance + 
intravillage variance). 
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  Table 3 Estimation of the Determinants of Household Income, 2002 
Dependent variable: Log of per capita 













Village-level       
Equipped with electricity before the 













Share of junior high school graduates
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   -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
Fixed assets   
 
 
   0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Education level   
 
   0.011 
(0.013) 
 
Education level squared 
 
   0.002** 
(0.0009) 
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Random-effects Parameters       


















Deviance 14838.67 14818.48  14800.23   
R-squared      
Number of observations 9104  9104  9104 
Number of villages 956  956  956 
 
Notes:  
1. This table reports the results of a two level hierarchical linear model nested at the village 
level. All the equations are fitted with fixed slopes for the first level variables. 
2. Coefficients on provincial dummies are not reported. 
3. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4. Province dummies are included in all of the equations, but are not reported here. About 
half of the province dummies are statistically significant, which illustrates the significance 
of the location factor. 
 
  
Table 4 Effects of Village Management by the Village Types, 2002 
 
                                      Village-specific 
                                      v a r i a b l e s   a d d e d  
                                      t o   t h e   b a s e l i n e  
                                      e q u a t i o n  
Types of villages 
Collective economic 
entities 
Village  budget  for 
public services, 1998   
Social stability   
Level of economic development 
  Underdeveloped  villages  







  Developed  villages  








  Mountainous  villages  







  Nonmountainous  villages 








Historical level of labor mobility 
  Villages  of  low  mobility 







  Villages  of  high  mobility 








1. This table reports the coefficients on the variables that relate to village management estimated by the village types. Estimations 
are based on the baseline equation in the village-mean centered form (the first column of Table 3) and the relevant 
village-specific variables are added in the equations. 
2. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 5a Cross-Level Interaction Effect of Village Management and Rate of Return to 
Education 
 
              Village-level  variables 
              o n   v i l l a g e   m a n a g e m e n t







services, 1998   
Social 
stability  


















Coefficient on interaction term of 

























Coefficient on the village budget for 













Coefficient on interaction term of 









1. This table reports the coefficients on the variables for village management, village-mean 
centered years of education of working-age adults, and their interaction terms. Estimations 
are based on the baseline equation in the village-mean centered form (the first column of 
Table 3) and the relevant variables are added in the equations. 
2. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Figure 1 Framework of the Study 
Village-specific factors Household attributes
 ŋPhysical infrastructure ŋPhysical and human capital endowments
 ŋHuman capital endowment ŋDemographic characteristics
 ŋLevel of social capital    
 ŋVillage management and public policy
    Household
    income
 ŋEconomic development level
 ŋGeographical location
 ŋHistorical level of labor mobility
Types of village (Basic socioeconomic conditions)
 




 Appendix Table A Distribution of Sample Villages by Province, 2002 Data Sets 
Province  Number of sample 
administrative 
villages 
Province  Number of sample 
administrative 
villages 
Beijing  16  Hunan  45 
Hebei  37  Guangdong  53 
Shanxi  40  Guangxi  40 
Liaoning  45  Chongqing  20 
Jilin  48  Sichuan  50 
Jiangsu  44  Guizhou  40 
Zhejiang  53  Yunnan  26 
Anhui  44 Shaanxi  37 
Jiangxi  43 Gansu  32 
Shandong  63 Xinjiang  80 
Henan  53    




                                          
*
1 Manuscript prepared for Björn Gustafsson, Li Shi, and Terry Sicular (eds.) 
Inequality and Public Policy in China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming in 2007. The surveys on which this paper based on were funded by 
the Ford Foundation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 
Asian Development Bank, Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Foundation, the Grant in 
Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society of the Promotion of Science 
(JSPS), and Hitotsubashi University. The authors are grateful for their generous 
support. 
2 The institutional cause of large disparities in the village-level political economy 
is that the administrative village is regarded as a “self-governing community 
(nongcun jiceng zizhi zuzhi),” not a formal governmental apparatus in spite of its 
de facto position as a local government.   
3 Many qualitative studies focus on a single village or several villages (see, for 
example, Friedman, Pickowicz, Selden, and Johnson 1991; Huang 1985; 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jingji Yanjiusuo “Wubao” Diaocha Ketizu 1999). 
4 Regarding to a detailed illustration of the CASS CHIP survey, see Li, Luo, Wei, 
and Yue (forthcoming). 
5 The administrative village survey is funded partly by the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science (JSPS) and Hitotsubashi University. 
6 Note that the work sample for empirical study only has 9104 households 
because of missing values for village-level variables (e.g., village expenditure in 
1998). 
7 The village mean income for 2002 collected from the village questionnaire has a 
strong correlation with the village mean income aggregated from the household 
survey (r = 0.809, n = 951). 
8 The rental value of housing is not included. See the Introduction and Appendix 
                                                                                                                  
of this book for detailed discussion of the definition of income. 
9 As for the methodology of the hierarchical linear model, see Kreft and De 
Leeuw (1998) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). 
10 As for random effects, δ0j indicates the deviation of each village from the grand 
mean and δ1j indicates the unique increment to the overall slope associated with 
village j. 
11 Logit-transformed share of farmland R is defined as R = ln (r / (1-r)), where r is 
the original figure for the share of irrigated farmland. 
12 The lineage organization (zongzu), that is, the traditional Chinese patrilineal 
descent, or the natural village (zirancun) would be a more suitable unit for 
analysis, although the administrative village and the natural village sometimes 
overlap, especially in North China. 
13 The term economic entity here refers to jingji shiti in Chinese, which means 
generally an economic unit engaged in business activities. 
14 Regarding the typology of villages, we refer the historical study by Huang. In 
order to examine the village-state relations in North China in the twentieth 
century, he classified 33 Mantetsu-surveyed villages according to the level of 
commercialization and labor mobility (see appendix of Huang 1985). 
15 As official village level documents no longer have reported statistics on 
employment structure, the figures are based on estimation by village cadres. Logit 
transformation is made by the same way as the share of irrigated farmland. 
16 This is the combined model of the household level model yij = β0j + εij and the 
village level model β0j = γ00 + δ0j. 
17 All the equations are fitted with fixed slopes for household-level variables. This 
is because our trials to fit random slopes for household-level variables show that 
variances of the slopes are not significant and because addition of random slopes 
will make the fixed part of parameters more unstable. 
                                                                                                                  
18 Though it is not reported in the table, we also conducted OLS estimation with 
robust standard error for clustering at the village level and confirmed that the 
results are consistent with the hierarchical linear equations. 
19 The percentages of villages that reported a reduction of such funding were: 34 
percent of high-income villages (more than 3500 yuan per capita net annual 
income), 47 percent of upper-middle-income villages (2500–3500 yuan), 51 
percent of lower-middle-income villages (1500–2500 yuan), and 54 percent of 
low-income villages (less than 1500 yuan). Several previous studies have already 
reported similar findings (see, for example Qi, Zhao, and Yuan 2003 and Zhu, 
Zhang, and Yan 2003). 
20 Several other issues also must be deferred to further studies. For example, it 
would be interesting to employ a microgrowth framework to examine the 
determinants of income growth at the village level (for relevant previous literature, 
see Ravallion and Jalan 1996). 
 